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UK Citizenship in the Early 21st
Century: Earning and Losing the
Right to Stay




1 From the mid-1990s Britain has been a popular destination for migrants and the country
has experienced rising trends of people migrating to the UK for different reasons. Today
Britain’s  foreign-born  population  includes  economic  migrants  from  and  outside  the
European Economic Area (EEA), asylum seekers, students, visitors and irregulars. Their
numbers  have  risen  swiftly  and  steadily  so  that  immigration  has  been  exceeding
emigration by more than 100,000 in every year since the turn of the century.1 Although
the UK has been a multi-national and multicultural society for quite a long time now,
over the last fifteen years intense debates on immigration and citizenship have led to
several  policy  reviews  and  significant  reforms  of  British  citizenship.  The  policy
developments presented below span the 1997-2014 period during which modifications to
the  processes  of  settlement  but  also  of  acquiring  and  losing  UK  citizenship  were
implemented. Governmental instruments of migration policy narrowed down the number
of  “acceptable  migrants”  by way of  stricter  border  controls  to  detect  irregulars  and
measures to fight human trafficking, the implementation of the points based system to
replace work permits, the introduction of a net cap on migrant workers, the delivery of
fewer  student  visas,  the  rapid  processing  of  asylum  requests  and  a  greater  use  of
deportation orders to expel failed asylum seekers and irregulars from the country. 
2 The purpose of this paper is to explore UK citizenship in its political and institutional
dimensions  and  more  specifically,  to  analyse  the  type  of  relationship  or  ‘point  of
connection’ that successive governments sought to define between aspirant citizens and
the  British  state.  Naturalisation  in  the  UK brings  with  it  not  only  the  right  to  live
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permanently but also the impossibility for the British state to deport somebody. As such
holding UK citizenship remains crucial for many migrants and their families wishing to
remove  the  possible  threat  of  the  revocation  of  the  settled  status  and  the  possible
deportation order that may follow. In the period under study the legal requirements to
acquire British citizenship were modified on several occasions so that today, the concept
of  British  citizenship  appears  as  a  multi-layered  one.  Formally  citizenship  has  been
conceived as a positive demonstration of applicants’ identification with Britain: taking of
language and UK Life tests and participation in the citizenship ceremonies. It is clear that
since the mid-1990s the renewed emphasis on citizenship has testified to a perceived lack
of integration of some communities and policy changes have been driven by the desire to
change foreign individuals’ relation to the British state. Governments also showed their
clear intention to shape the contours of an ideal ‘foreign’ population, able and willing to
integrate  into British  society  and discourage  and potentially  reject  those  deemed to
constitute  a  threat  (be  it  economic,  social  or  terrorist)  to  Britain’s  interests.  In  that
respect denaturalization, that is the stripping of British citizenship by British authorities,
reminds us that conferring or removing UK citizenship remains a state power and that
acquiring British citizenship is not a right but a privilege in the hands of the executive.
 
Citizenship as a right or a privilege? Political
discourses and legal requirements
3 Questions of nationality are related to immigration law which regulates the legal rights
and responsibilities of different categories of migrants, so that the right to acquire British
citizenship is highly dependent upon one’s legal immigration status. Although it would be
beyond the scope of this paper to dwell on the many reforms in the field of immigration
policy, some of the objectives and implications of citizenship policy are tightly connected
to the immigration agenda. In 2014, just 125,800 foreign residents became British citizens
through naturalisation, a significant decrease compared to the average of 195,800 per
year over the 2009-2013 period.2 Amid concerns about integration and social cohesion,
the Labour governments and the Coalition developed a citizenship agenda centred on a
reconceptualization of British identity that would-be citizens can “attain by ‘internalising’ a
set of core values”.3 Accordingly governments modified the legal procedure and practice
through several pieces of legislation: Immigration, Nationality and Asylum Act of 2002, Asylum
and  Immigration  Act  of  2004,  Immigration,  Nationality  and  Asylum  Act  of  2006,  Borders,
Citizenship and Immigration Act of 2009 and Immigration Act of 2014.
4 When coming into office New Labour adopted a distinctive approach to modernize Britain
which included an updating of citizenship in their political project and a first attempt to
define  ideal  British  citizens.  As  John  Clarke  argued  “New  Labour’s  ideal  citizens  are
moralized,  choice-making,  self-directing  subjects”.4 Following the  Crick  report  (1998),
citizenship education was introduced in English secondary schools and the Advisory Board
on Naturalisation and Integration (ABNII) was set up to work on the creation of language and
citizenship courses and tests for would-be citizens. The disturbances of the summer 2001
and  the  Cantle  report  commissioned  to  make  recommendations  on  social  cohesion
showed  the  government’s  main  concern  to  promote  common  citizenship  between
different  ethnic  communities.  It  “emphasised  the  importance  of  promoting  a  ‘meaningful
concept  of  citizenship’”.5 As Home Secretary Blunkett  asserted:  “We need to  educate  new
migrants in citizenship and help them to develop an understanding of our language, democracy
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and culture”.6 The 2002 White Paper “Safe Haven, Secure Borders” (Home Office 2002) that
followed proposed an inclusive version of the concept of citizenship based on a common
identity with essential attributes to which people should identify. The text insisted on the
rights and duties attached to UK citizenship defined in terms of belonging to the ‘nation’
and focused primarily on the nature and extent of citizen behaviours.7 The Home Office
recommended to abandon the “low-key and bureaucratic approach which the UK has adopted
to the acquisition of British citizenship”. The Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 made
citizenship  ceremonies  mandatory,  thereby  creating  a  new  legal  condition  in  the
acquisition of British citizenship (see infra).
5 Five years later, in July 2007 in its Green Paper The Governance of Britain, the fourth Labour
government reassessed the nature of the links between its citizens and the state. The
concept of citizenship was further explored within the process of naturalisation to move
beyond the primary definition of  citizenship as simply a formal legal  status so as to
include  a  prescriptive  dimension  where  ‘formal  citizenship’  would  be  reconciled  to
‘substantive citizenship’. Such reflexion was born after the London bombings of July 2005,
the re-emergence of the terrorist threat in the summer of 2006 (with the thwarting of
planned  bomb  attacks  on  several  transatlantic  flights)  and  also  the  Islamic  veil
controversy  triggered  off  by  Labour  leader  Jack  Straw.  Queries  were  raised  in  the
political, social but also academic spheres on the scope of British multiculturalism but
also on its perceived failures. In the governmental view there was a growing feeling that
more had to be done in the fields of the politics of belonging and the management of
national boundaries.8 Although the governmental rhetoric acknowledged the diversity of
the different communities living in the UK, it also insisted on a supreme identity deriving
from a “multicultural construction of British identity”9:
Each of us possesses multiple identities because we define ourselves in different
ways depending on the factors that matter most to us. Factors such as gender, race,
ethnicity, age, disability, class and faith are shared with some and different from
others. But in addition to these there is a national identity that we can all hold in
common: the overarching factor – British citizenship – that brings the nation
together.10 
6 Yet such conception is prescriptive and entailed the revision of British citizenship to
adapt it to ‘the rights and responsibilities’ already foreshadowed in the 2002 text. To the
government it was time to devise clearer criteria on citizenship acquisition and to have
them implemented through detailed injunctions and formal rules. They pointed out that
the concept had been overstretched in some occasions so as to include “everything and
nothing at the same time”11:
The Government believes that a clearer definition of citizenship would give people
a better sense of their British identity in a globalised world. British citizenship –
and the  rights  and responsibilities  that  accompany it –  needs  to  be  valued and
meaningful.12 
7 The next step was the publication of a governmental report in February 2008, entitled The
Path to Citizenship: next steps in reforming the immigration system, followed by the passing of
the Borders,  Citizenship  and  Immigration  Act  2009.  The  new  act replaced  citizenship
acquisition  within  the  broader  framework  of  migration  policies  which  led  to  a
strengthening of border controls (in particular with new powers for customs officials and
immigration  officers)  and  extended  the  time  it  takes  to  gain  citizenship.  More
significantly the text broke the link between length of residence, right to settlement and
naturalisation.13 It  amended  the  rules  on  naturalisation  to  reduce  the  number  of
UK Citizenship in the Early 21st Century: Earning and Losing the Right to Stay
Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, XXI-1 | 2016
3
immigrants allowed to remain permanently: “A bill...to ensure that newcomers to the United
Kingdom earn the right to stay” (emphasis mine). UK citizenship was conceived as the final
step in the journey made by migrants who had decided to come to Britain. Newcomers
were first granted a temporary residence status (for a period up to 5 years), then allowed
to progress to probationary citizenship (for a minimum of 12 months) to finally reach
permanent residence, i.e. British citizenship. Conditions were attached to probationary
citizenship, in particular provisions stipulated that migrants were enjoined to “make the
right contribution to the country”. Critics pointed out that the new conditions were going to
lead many to lose their entitlement to remain in the UK.14 The limits of the 2009 act were
clear  making  it  longer  and  harder  for  migrants  to  become  settled  and  gain  British
citizenship. The introduction of the ‘probationary period’ in the route to citizenship was
meant to prevent migrants from having full access to a range of benefits available to
permanently settled foreign nationals. The notion of ‘active participation/contribution’
to British society was particularly ambiguous. Applicants were required to prove they
were  of  good  character  and  that  they  were  good  taxpayers.  It  was  also  about
demonstrating some sort of positive interaction with the local community.15 As Anderson
points out “the community of value is populated not simply by citizens but by Good citizens,
imagined law-abiding and hard-working members  of  stable  and respectable  families”.16 Since
then, the moralistic connotations attached to the acquisition of British citizenship have
had a ‘utilitarian’ dimension praising the economic worthiness of certain categories of
migrants. 
8 The coalition government sought to simplify the system they inherited; the probationary
stage, deemed too complex and bureaucratic was abandoned in July 2011 and so was the
concept of ‘active citizenship’ which was meant to entice migrants doing volunteering in
their community.17 This abandon may seem incoherent with the Big Society agenda which
encouraged the civil society and local communities in particular to engage and be part of
policy change. The Big Society concept was aimed at motivating participation through
various forms but the Home Office’s decision to drop the ‘active citizenship’ requirement
implicitly excluded parts of the foreign population from the Big Society agenda.
9 The latest reform on the conditions to acquire British citizenship has not modified the
overwhelming  spirit of  the  definition,  citizenship  under  the  coalition  and  now  the
Conservative government remains prescriptive and utilitarian: the right to stay must still
be ‘earned’ by prospective citizens. The moral and economic worthiness of some would-
be citizens remains a crucial requirement to become part of the national community.
Quite  significantly  in  December  2012  the  Cameron-Clegg  administration  sought  to
reinforce the weight of ‘the good character’ requirement when assessing applications for
UK citizenship. The requirement was stipulated in the British Nationality Act of 1981 but
was never properly defined, nor was any statutory guidance issued as to how this should
be interpreted or applied in practice. In December 2007 in a Home Office announcement
the criterion was related to the question of criminal convictions and since then it has
been  used  more  often  than  not  by  case  workers  when  rejecting  applications  for
naturalisation. Refusals of naturalisation applications based on the failure to meet ‘the
good character requirement’ accounted for 34% of all refusals in 2014, a steady increase
since 2010 (29% of all refusals).18 
10 More recently in an effort  to introduce transparency in its  practice the Home Office
published a series of instructions to its citizenship officers on how to interpret ‘the good
character’  requirement  when  assessing  citizenship  applications.19 In  particular
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instructions have been given to check: (i) the criminal record of the applicants, whether
laws have not been respected or are not going to be respected (!), (ii) taxes have not been
paid, (iii) activities in the community have not been adequate, (iv) deception has been
used in the dealings with the UK government, (v) the applicant has been involved in
notorious activities.
11 The renewed emphasis on citizenship in UK politics was meant to strengthen “a sense of
common citizenship as a way of  building social  cohesion”.20 Such concern was born in the
context of a very fast changing societal landscape and led to debates on the pertinence of
the multicultural model and on the ways to ensure that would-be citizens would abide by
the democratic values of the country. 
 
Earning the right to stay: commitment and
identification with Britain’s values
12 The significance of becoming a British citizen has been underpinned by the idea that “
citizenship is more esteemed and valued when it is earned, not given”.21 In line with the ‘earned
citizenship’ framework and the ideal of a ‘committed’ British citizen, future citizens have
been invited to take part in a dynamic political  process and not simply be the mere
recipient/subject of a bureaucratic procedure.22 The acquisition of citizenship has been
more arduous, not anymore an automatic right conferred after a few years of residence in
the UK as it was the case a decade before. Governments have intended to make it more
onerous and longer for migrants to secure rights in the name of security concerns in
particular. The acquisition of UK citizenship is conditional upon progressing successfully
through various stages and it is a demanding process which requires, until the final stage
with the participation in the citizenship ceremony, the individual’s full commitment to
the  naturalisation  procedure  (see  below).  However  the  system  does  not  offer  many
alternatives to those who do not apply for citizenship, those who do not meet the criteria
(and will  never  do)  or  fail  to  satisfy  the  tests.  In  the  governmental  perspective  the
naturalisation procedure  remains  a  privilege  and not  a  right;  it  has  an exclusionary
dimension, which in the end threatens the permanence of several categories of migrants
who do not fit in the normative requisites: failed asylum seekers, students, irregulars,
overstayers, those with a criminal conviction. The rules contribute to perpetuate the old
dichotomy  between deserving  and  undeserving  migrants:  “‘Good  migrants’  are  seen  as
worthy of  British  citizenship,  whereas  ‘bad migrants’  are  seen as  unworthy”.23 Eligibility  to
naturalize is closely correlated to the legislation on entry, as exemplified by the case of
students and those with temporary visas who cannot accumulate sufficient time toward
fulfilling residency requirements. Anderson uses the term ‘failed citizens’ “to allude to
those individuals and groups who are imagined as incapable of achieving, or failing to live up to,
national  ideals”.24 While  she  alludes  to  other  categories  of  migrants  than  students,
irregulars and failed asylum seekers, it could be argued that there has been a deliberate
attempt to create categories of ‘failed would-be citizens’ in the name of economic and
social worthiness. This is epitomized by Kiwan who stress that “a ‘moral’  conception of
citizenship is invoked in the notion of ‘good’ citizen predicated on primarily economic ground”.25
Her postulate is related to her analysis of the implications for citizenship of the highly
skilled ‘guest-workers’ programme when implemented in 2010, but it was still valid four
years later to depict the Coalition citizenship agenda. In that respect the governmental
rhetoric  of  acquiring citizenship drew on the notion of  a  deal,  a  contract  concluded
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between newcomers/aspirant-citizens and the State, one which should put on a par the
aspirant citizen and the State: 
[T]here  is  a  deal  for  citizenship.  This  is  a  country  of  liberty  and  tolerance,
opportunity and diversity-and these values are reinforced by the expectation that
all who live here should learn our language, play by the rules, obey the law and
contribute to the community.26 
13 Formally the deal has had a twofold dimension: the testing of immigrants’ mastery of the
national language and their compliance with a set of distinctive ‘national’ values. 
14 The  knowledge  of  English  has  been  for  candidates  a  longstanding  criterion  in  their
application for naturalisation. It had been stipulated in the British Nationality Act 1981
but it was a condition among others like the absence of any criminal conviction and was
not rigorously enforced up to the Labour years. In the wake of the 2001 summer riots, the
terrorist  attacks  of  September  2001  and  following  the  recommendations  made  by
different commissions (2003 Advisory Group’s report, Crick Report 2002/03) the second Blair
government laid stress on the necessity for future citizens to have a good command of the
English  language.  Quite  explicitly  the  linguistic  requirement  in  the  2002  Nationality,
Immigration and Asylum Act had an immediate short-term economic objective: to fill the
needs of the domestic labour market, at a time when skilled migrants and professionals
were more than welcome to contribute to the economic development of the country.
Linguistic assimilation was also deemed essential to strengthen cohesiveness and since
then the linguistic competence has been an absolute precondition for acceptance.27 There
has been broad ministerial acceptance across the political spectrum that ‘shared values’
and a good command of the English language are perfect indicators of ‘integration’ in the
UK: 
The requirement  to  have  an  adequate  understanding  of  English  needs  to  mean
something, and needs to be supplemented by a level of knowledge of what it means
to be a citizen of modern, democratic Britain. (…) We are developing new types of
courses especially suited to the needs of migrants: English language courses which
use  teaching  materials  based  on  the  concept  of  citizenship;  courses  specifically
about citizenship for people who already have an adequate English but need to
know more  about  what  it  means  to  live  in  this  country  and contribute  to  this
community.28 
There is now agreement with the proposition I made some time ago that for new
citizens,  learning English should be a requirement. New citizens should have an
understanding of our history and our culture.29 
Real integration takes time. That's why, when there have been significant numbers
of  new people  arriving  in  neighbourhoods  perhaps  not  able  to  speak  the  same
language as those living there, on occasions not really wanting or even willing to
integrate,  that  has  created  a  kind  of discomfort  and  disjointedness  in  some
neighbourhoods.30 
15 Since 2005 the linguistic proficiency of future citizens has been certified by the ESOL Test
Entry Three (English for Speakers of Other Languages). This minimum level of English
means that candidates must be able to hold a conversation on whatever subject in an
acceptable English, even if it is not perfect.31 The advantages of the British official ESOL is
that  it  has  a  clearly  defined  linguistic  level  and  is  implemented  coherently  and
consistently across the UK. Dina Kiwan makes a positive appraisal of the system, arguing
that:
[T]he  English  language  requirements  is  not  intended  to  be  a  hurdle  to  the
acquisition  of  citizenship;  rather  it  is  the  first  step  to  communicating  and
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participating with one’s fellow citizens, learning and integrating into a new culture.
32 
16 This may be contrasted with some harsher criticisms expressed by other commentators,
in particular associations defending immigrants’ rights (see Joint Council for the Welfare
of Immigrants,  Immigration Law Practitioners Association) who stress that the test is
apprehended as a mixed blessing by migrants. Criticisms have pointed out that these tests
are particularly demanding for some categories of foreigners, namely illiterate candidates
and those with a poor educational background and particularly women who in some parts
of the world may not have had access to any elementary education. The financial aspect
should not be undervalued for the fees to pay for the tests and the cost of the language
training may be considered as deterring elements in the path to integration. Furthermore
since September 2011 the effects of the budgetary cuts in funding ESOL courses have
proven another disincentive to plan acquiring citizenship. Under the current scheme free
places  are  only  allocated  to  those  on  jobseeker’s  allowance  or  employment  support
allowance (that is, benefits paid to those actively seeking work). 
17 By the end of 2005 the requirement to ‘share values’ had become salient in the wake of
the  London  bombings (July)  and  the  Lozells  riots  (October).  Deep  concerns  over  a
perceived  lack  of  integration  was  prominent  in  public  discourse.  The  government’s
response to the 2007 report of the Commission on Integration and Cohesion (2008) was clear
in that respect: 
The Border and Immigration Agency is reviewing how the process of becoming a
citizen can enhance the integration of individual migrants into UK society.  This
includes consideration of issues such as what are the values that newcomers should
be committed to.33 
18 The UK Life test modified on several occasions requires candidates to answer a series of
questions  based  on a  Home Office  handbook:  Life  in  the  United  Kingdom:  A  Journey  to
Citizenship (2004, 2005, 2007, 2013 editions). The terms ‘comprehension, knowledge of a
foreign  language’  are  to  be  understood  in  their  etymological  and  socio-cultural
dimensions. The concept of ‘life in the UK’ is used in a broad meaning to cover, in a
condensed  version,  events  pertaining  to  the  history  of  the  UK but  also  elements  of
geography, politics and literature. As of March 2013 the latest version of the UK Life Test
has laid the emphasis  on applicants’  mastery of  British culture and recent historical
developments (in relation to devolution for example) rather than on their knowledge of
British daily life as it was the case in the former versions:
It is a move away from the old one – stuff on rights, practical information that has
little to do with British culture – to one that is  clear about responsibilities and
requires people to have a grounding in our history.34 
19 Experts have accused the new test of many flaws: “impractical,  irrelevant,  trivial,  gender
imbalanced,  outdated and ineffective”.35 Clearly it  is aimed at an educated (if  not highly
educated)  migrant  population,  those  who,  in  the  view of  the  government,  are  most
welcome to remain in the UK. The relatively high level of the tests is in line with the
wider  framework  on  immigration  control  that  successive  governments  have  been
implementing: strict selection to accept in the UK only those highly skilled migrants who
can bring specific benefits to the United Kingdom. Both tests have put the onus on the
applicants to demonstrate their sufficient knowledge and their ability to integrate. They
remain closely connected to the wider agenda on immigration control.
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20 Until a decade ago, there was not any public ceremony celebrating the incorporation and
the belonging of the new British citizens to their new country, contrary to what exists in
the  US  and  Canada  for  example.  Together  with  the  language  and  UK Life  Test,  the
ceremonies were born in the aftermath of the 2001 civil disturbances and terror threats
when the Labour governments sought to reinforce their national models of integration
linking their  citizenship regulations to “the  politics  of  belonging and the  management  of
national  boundaries”.36 Within the larger  context  of  globalisation and increased,  faster
rates  of  immigration the  creation of  these  ceremonies  was  also  underpinned by  the
intention of the British state to assert its sovereignty over newcomers. 
21 Britain’s case is not isolated as testified by the development of citizenship ceremonies in
other  European countries  like  France,  the  Netherlands  or  Denmark during the  same
decade. The political roots of the development of these ceremonies lie in part in the
recommendations made by the European Commission which encouraged European states
to celebrate officially the naturalisation of their new citizens according to the motto “
United  within  diversity”.37 The  European  Ministerial  Conference  on  Integration  in
November 2008 endorsed the proposal and recommended:
[T]o establish ambitious integration policies, to stress respect for the identities of
the Member States and the European Union and for their fundamental values, such
as human rights, freedom of opinion, democracy, tolerance, equality between men
and women, and the compulsory schooling of children.38 
22 In Britain when the first ceremonies were created, they were presented as a way to (i)
disentangle  a  purely  administrative  procedure  of  registering  citizenship  from  its
bureaucratic characteristics and (ii) as an occasion given to migrants to publicly proclaim
the choice they had made, embodying the concept of a voluntarist integration.39 
23 The first citizens to participate in a citizenship ceremony were reminded of this two-fold
dimension in the opening discourse made by Home Secretary David Blunkett in 2004: 
Becoming a British citizen is a significant life event. The Government intends to
make gaining British citizenship meaningful and celebratory rather than simply a
bureaucratic  process.  New  citizenship  ceremonies  will  help  people  mark  this
important event. We want British citizenship to embrace positively the diversity of
background, culture and faiths that living in modern Britain involves.40 
24 Following the American and Canadian models the British have made the choice to include
the  ceremony  in  the  process  of  naturalisation,  hence  giving  the  pledge  sworn  by
applicants its full  legal  significance.  Any candidate,  above 18,  who has received their
invitation to participate in such a ceremony must swear an oath/affirmation of allegiance
to Her Majesty the Queen and a pledge of loyalty to the UK. These declarations are made
aloud simultaneously by all the candidates-citizens.41 Their significance was recalled by
the Home Secretary in the Commons:
We may all have a slightly different interpretation of what they might be (i.e. the
values we all attach to British citizenship), but I am confident that Members of this
House would agree that this is encapsulated by the oath that naturalized citizens
take when they attend their citizenship ceremonies.42 
25 The unfolding of these ceremonies features a combination of legal characteristics (the
swearing of a pledge/oath of allegiance) and strong symbolic elements such as the display
of national and European flags and the playing of the national anthems. Quite early, the
Home Office advised local authorities on the text of the welcoming speeches, suggesting
what should be read to participants:
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On behalf of the Government of Her Majesty Queen Elisabeth the Second and (local
authority) I would like to welcome you all here today to (venue) for this citizenship
ceremony. This for (many of you) is the final step in the process of becoming a
British  citizen,  which  will  welcome  you  to  this  nation  and  community.  The
citizenship ceremony is a rite of passage that formally welcomes those who wish to
join us into full membership of the British family, and into citizenship of the United
Kingdom, a state built on a union of nations, beliefs and common civic values. We
are  here  today  to  extend  this  welcome  to  you  and  to  confer  the  honour  of
citizenship upon you.43
26 Except for the first ceremonies that hosted governmental members, nowadays all of these
opening discourses are made by local citizenship officers whose discursive strategies and
rhetorical devices converge. There may be local variations as to the contents to adapt to
the regional context and to the origins of the participants.44 Standardized speeches and
texts are meant to ease and simplify the procedure even though the overuse of symbolic
terms testify to the solemnity that the state intends to give to these ceremonies. The
rituals should embody the enriching links between the new citizens and the state: 
I think the new ceremonies across the country will be the answer to those who fear
difference, who fear the diversity which comes with migration of people coming
across the world to live in our community and sends a very clear message that
those who choose to be part of the family are committing themselves.45
Becoming a British citizen is a milestone event in an individual’s life – we have
recognised  the  importance  of  the  event  by  introducing  citizenship  ceremonies
which celebrate  the  act  of  becoming a  British  citizen.  An understanding of  the
British language and our way of life is vital.46 
27 Ten years after the celebration of the first citizenship ceremony there has certainly been
a gradual cooling of enthusiasm for these rituals. Local authorities organise them on a
regular basis but they have become an administrative process, “albeit an important and
celebratory one”.47
 
Losing the right to stay: denaturalisation and the state
power to deprive
28 Holding citizenship means having a protected legal status under international law and
the right to a nationality is guaranteed by article 15 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.48 Yet, the UK has long retained the power to deprive somebody of his/her
citizenship, a topic explored by Gibney in his article on the historical development of
denaturalisation.49 As was argued in the first part, holding citizenship has been construed
as a privilege, not a right, which is why “denaturalisation affirms citizenship as a privilege, one
that is conditional on a certain standard of behaviour”.50 In recent years Home Secretaries
have  been  exercising  more  and  more  their  power  to  strip  people  of  their  British
citizenship and withdraw passport facilities for those individuals suspected of  having
been involved in terrorist activities (especially overseas) or considered to be a threat to
national security (see table below). This discretionary power has been expanded in the
2014 Immigration Act (clause 60).  The text of the new clause on deprivation aroused
animated debates in the Commons and the Lords during the winter of 2013-2014 and led
to  the  government’s  defeat  at  report  stage  in  the  House  of  Lords.51 The  clause  was
inserted in the wake of a landmark case lost by the British government in 2013, Secr. Of
State for the Home Department v. Al-Jedda52 the first case on deprivation of citizenship to
reach the Supreme Court. The judgement based on section 40 of the British Nationality
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Act of 1981 which prohibits the Home Secretary to deprive somebody of their British
citizenship if that would render the person stateless, irritated the executive profoundly
and led Teresa May to introduce at a late stage an amendment on denaturalisation in the
2014 immigration bill. The government’s main argument to back up their proposal was
that British citizenship is not a right but a privilege. Mark Harper, then immigration
minister stated rather clearly that 
[T]hose who threaten this country’s security put us all at risk. This government will
take all necessary steps to protect the public. Citizenship is a privilege, not a right.
These proposals will strengthen the Home Secretary’s powers to ensure that very
dangerous individuals can be excluded if it is in the public interest to do so.53 
29 Such defence echoes Hillary Clinton’s words on the privilege to hold US citizenship.54 The
government, defeated in the Lords, substituted the Lords’ amendments with two of their
own which now form the basis of clause 60.
30 The  new clause  on  deprivation  of  UK  citizenship  modifies  section  40  of  the  British
Nationality Act 1981 and stipulates the conditions under which an order can be made by
the Home Secretary to deprive a person of their British citizenship. The clause provides
that (i)  a  British person can be deprived of  his/her citizenship if  it  was acquired by
naturalisation, and that (ii) the deprivation is conducive to public good and that (iii) “the
secretary of state has reasonable grounds for believing that the person is able to become a national
of another country”. The power can only be used against persons who naturalised and not
those who are citizens by birth or registration. The intention of the government is to
exercise this power while the person is outside the UK so as to prevent his/her return to
the UK, which may leave the person stranded in exile abroad without any valid passport
to  travel  with.  There  are  far  reaching  implications  behind  a  deprivation  order  as
stipulated by the new act. The power which is to be exercised when the person is abroad
will  prevent the person from entering the UK again and from lodging any appeal  in
Britain. It may also be, as the ILPA stress that the right to appeal against the deprivation
order may not be exercised in time since the individual stripped of his/her citizenship
may be unaware of the decision and of his right of appeal.  In addition, although the
government  has  been  arguing  that  a  person  may  acquire  another  citizenship  when
deprived of his/her British citizenship, in practice as documentary evidence gathered by
the ILPA demonstrates, it may prove very difficult to do so in countries known for their
strong executive and widespread discretionary power (Ethiopia, Swaziland, Sierra Leone,
Zimbabwe, or the Dominican Republic).55 




BNA  1948  provided  that  registered  citizens  could  lose  their
citizenship  if  it  had  been  acquired  by  fraud  or
misrepresentation
BNA 1981 (section 40) stipulates that the Home Secretary can
issue  an  order  of  deprivation  if  he/she  is  satisfied  that
deprivation is ‘conducive to public good’ but it prohibits the
deprivation order if ‘he/she is satisfied that the order would
make a person stateless’.
1
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2002-2006
Immigration, Nationality and Asylum Act 2002
Deprivation  provisions  are  extended  to  all  types  of  citizens
(native-born citizens, registered and naturalised). Grounds for
deprivation:  if  a  person  has  done  anything  seriously
prejudicial to the vital interests of the UK except if that would
make the person stateless.  Granted a right of appeal against
the deprivation order.
Asylum and Immigration Act 2004: Denaturalization could be
immediate  even  before  the  appeal  against  the  deprivation
order had been heard.
1
2006-2012
Immigration, Nationality and Asylum Act 2006 (S.4, S.56)
Lower standards for deprivation: “that the Secr. of state can show
that  an  individual’s  holding  citizenship  was  not  conducive  to  the
public good”
21
2013 Immigration, Nationality and Asylum Act 2006 (S.4, S.56) 20
Coalition
government
Immigration Act 2014 (into force July 2014)
A  British  person can be  deprived of  his/her  citizenship  if  it
was  acquired  by  naturalisation,  and  (ii)  the  deprivation  is
conducive to public good and that (iii) ‘the secretary of state
has reasonable grounds for believing that the person is able to
become a national of another country’.
48  as  at  3  June
2014
31 Sources: www.ilpa.org.uk, House of Commons 2014, 2015.
 
Conclusion
Citizenship  is  traditionally  understood  as  a  form of  relation,  most  often  as  a
relation between the citizen and the state, but also as a relation of membership (of
a society or political community). But citizenship acts as a point of connection –
indeed a  point  of  mobilisation  –  for  many individuals  and groups  who identify
themselves as citizens when they act, name themselves as people who would be
citizens  in  demanding  citizenship  or  demand  that  citizenship  be  enlarged,
enhanced or transformed to engage with other issues, identities and desires.56 
32 The concept of citizenship is multidimensional: it confers a legal status, gives social, civil
and political rights and is meant to embody the social and cultural identity of the host
country.  It  has  been  defined  by  statutory  texts,  secondary  rules  and  institutional
practices  which  have  evolved  over  the  past  decade.  Since  2010  the  attribution  of
citizenship has been underpinned by considerations which have not varied much from
the  Labour  period.  First,  citizenship  is  to  be  attributed  to  selected  migrants,  legal
immigrants who have gone through the various stages. Statutory or regulatory provisions
do not  cater for other categories  like students,  failed asylum seekers,  overstayers or
illegal migrants who, nowadays often constitute large groups of those residing in Britain.
Second, citizenship is to be attributed after a long journey, there is no easy path. British
governments  have  multiplied  the  obstacles  these  migrants  have  to  confront  and
overcome before being in a position to apply for citizenship and then be granted it. The
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active, solemn, moral and economic commitments expected from migrants are demanded
at a very early stage;  such expectation reinforces the heavy-handed approach of  the
British  State  which  intends  to  keep  an  ever  increasing  control  over  the  migrant
populations it wants to keep in. Symbolically the ceremonies continue to maintain new
citizens in a dependent position and they epitomise the unbalanced relationship between
the nation-state and its migrants. Acquiring citizenship has not been conceived as a right
but rather as a privilege, based on the eligibility of candidates. Likewise denaturalisation,
as recently reformed by the 2014 text, allows for much power to be concentrated in the
Home Secretary’s  hands.  In  the  name of  national  security, a  recurrent  argument  in
governmental  rhetoric,  successive  Home  Secretaries  have  broadened  the  scope  of
immigration controls and restricted eligibility to British citizenship with every new law. 
33 Biographie: Catherine Puzzo est  maître de conférences en civilisation britannique et
appartient au laboratoire de recherche Cultures Anglo-Saxonnes (EA 801) à l’université
Toulouse II Jean Jaurès. Elle participe actuellement à un projet de recherche international
(Paris  III  –  Rutgers,  State  University  of  New Jersey)  intitulé  SOMI  (Securitization  of
Migrant Integration), une comparaison Grande-Bretagne/Etats Unis de la typologie des
mobilisations collectives de communautés immigrées dans le contexte sécuritaire accru
de l’après 11 septembre. 
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ABSTRACTS
In  February  2009  Gordon Brown’s  government  promoted  the  concept  of  ‘earned  citizenship’
which is based on the principle that British citizenship is a privilege that must be earned, that
applying for UK citizenship is a long journey and that migrants have to undergo a series of tests
before being eligible  to  get  naturalized.  Successive  governments  have further  reinforced the
criteria  to  meet  with  the  introduction  of  a  renewed  version  of  the  UK  Life  Test,  the
reinforcement  of  the  probationary  citizenship  period  and  the  requirement  to  have  better
language skills than before. Ten years after their creation, citizenship ceremonies conceived as
the best way for newly registered citizens to show that they have a shared understanding of what
it  means  to  be  British  are  still  apprehended  as  a  means  to  give  a  political  and  ideological
significance to the attribution of citizenship through the development of a national statement of
values. Simultaneously the power to deprive somebody of his citizenship has been extended in a
context of increased securitization of migration. Home Secretaries have been exercising more
and more their power to strip people of their British citizenship and withdraw passport facilities
for those individuals suspected of having been involved in terrorist activities or considered to be
a threat to national security. 
En février 2009 le gouvernement de Gordon Brown promut le concept de ‘citoyenneté acquise’
basée sur le principe que la nationalité britannique est un privilège à conquérir, que le processus
de  naturalisation  est  long  (introduction  de  diverses  phases  préparatoires)  et  que  les  futurs
citoyens doivent réussir plusieurs sortes de tests (UK life test, test de langue). En outre, dix ans
après  leur  introduction,  les  cérémonies  de  naturalisation sont  plus  que jamais  un moyen de
donner une valeur politique et idéologique à l’attribution de la nationalité par le biais de valeurs
nationales  communes.  Enfin  et  parallèlement  au  renforcement  des  conditions  d’accès  à  la
nationalité les gouvernements britanniques ont étendu les critères permettant la déchéance de
nationalité et ce, dans un contexte sécuritaire renforcé.
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